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Abstract	
	
In	the	last	decade,	China's	government	has	been	supportive	of	various	cultural	trends	in	
creative	cities,	intangible	cultural	heritage,	and	the	arts.	This	paper	examines	the	discourse	
of	Chinese	cultural	and	creative	industries	(CCI),	specifically	from	the	position	of	traditional	
Chinese	opera.	By	focusing	on	the	Xi’an	Qinqiang	(Qin	opera)	cultural	industries	reform,	this	
article	articulates	the	intimate	relationship	between	Communist	Party’s	(CCP)	ideological	
evolution	and	the	struggle	of	Chinese	opera’s	development.	As	Chinese	opera	has	been,	and	
still	is,	a	popular	cultural	form	amongst	peasants	and	workers	(the	founding	base	of	the	
CCP),	the	struggle	of	the	opera	market	reforms	reflects	the	CCP	internal	turmoil	in	gaining	its	
own	political	(representative)	legitimacy.	The	paper	suggests	that	despite	fundamental	
ideological	shifts,	the	CCP	maintains	sole	legal	ruling	power	over	culture	because	of	China’s	
unique	regional-central	government	structure	and	the	‘social	mediator’	roles	occupied	by	
the	artists.	The	continued	negotiation	between	central	(ideology),	regional	(urbanization)	
and	community	(artist)	levels	forms	the	structure	of	China’s	latest	art	market	reform	and	
allows	us	to	understand	the	struggle	of	culture	within	the	nation.	
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Introduction		
The	concept	of	"Rights"	may	be	universally	
recognised,	and	universal	in	its	theoretical	
application,	but	is	always	subject	to	national,	
regional	and	cultural	political	economy.	Indeed	
even	where	a	country	is	signatory	to	international	
treatises	(in	1997	China	ratified	The	International	
Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights		
or	ICESCR),	it	does	not	follow	that	the	terms	of	the	
treatises	will	be	self-evident	in	a	regional	or	local	
cultural	context.	The	context	of	this	paper	is	China	
–	as	a	society	whose	conditions	of	development	is	
its	recent	socio-cultural	history.	Indeed,	China	has	
recently	been	supportive	of	the	UN's	Millennium	
Development	Goals	(2000-2015),	and	the	
following	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(the	
SDG's,	from	2016),	and	also	various	cultural	trends	
in	creative	cities,	intangible	cultural	heritage,	the	
arts	and	creative	industries.	Nonetheless,	the	
concept	of	"cultural	rights"	in	China	is	only	
partially	intelligible	(as	is	the	concept	of	"human	
rights"	in	general	–	notwithstanding	its	new	
National	Human	Rights	Action	Plan	2016-2020).		
	
In	this	article,	I	do	not	want	to	assess	the	
relationship	between	human	rights	and	culture,	or	
attempt	to	discern	the	nature	of	cultural	rights	
within	Chinese	society	and	its	political	regime.	I	
wish	to	pursue	a	subject	where	the	struggle	for	
cultural	rights	can	be	identified	as	immanent	to	
the	socio-historical	development	of	China's	
culture	–	that	is	to	say,	in	a	form	whose	conditions	
are	the	ideological	shifts	in	China's	stratified	
governance,	enduring	Communist	Party	(the	CCP),	
and	the	management	of	economy	and	
demography.	The	ideological	shifts	are	vast,	and	
here	I	can	only	refer	to	the	arts	and	creative	
industries,	but	it	is	possible	to	articulate	how	the	
arts	and	creative	industries	have	become	a	site	for	
a	struggle	of	legitimacy	–	for	both	artists	and	
Communist	Party.	This	article	attempts	to	
untangle	this	interrelated	struggle,	and	with	a	
view	to	understanding	the	concept	of	"rights"	in	a	
sense	that	registered	the	complexity	of	a	political	
economy	only	obliquely	related	to	Western	
norms.	A	"right"	in	China	is	not	a	simple	self-
assertion	or	self-evident	in	its	application;	it	is	
embedded	in	a	complex	struggle	for	identity,	
legitimacy	and	authority,	and	always	involves	
culture.			
Chinese	Opera	and	Chinese	Cultural	
Industries		
On	15th	October	2014,	after	Xi	Jinping’s	
inauguration,	the	President	gave	Talks	on	
Literature	and	Art	at	the	Beijing	People’s	
Congress.	In	the	Speech,	Xi	articulated	that	"arts	
and	artists	must	not	lose	direction	in	the	wave	of	
market	economy,	must	not	be	the	slave	of	capital"	
and	that	"the	future	of	Chinese	cultural	industries	
was	to	be	anchored	on	traditional	art	forms"	
(China	News,	2015).	After	having	delivered	the	
Beijing	Speech,	in	December	2014,	Xi,	along	with	
all	six	members	of	the	China	Central	Standing	
Committee	of	the	CCP	–	the	most	powerful	
decision	making	group	in	China	–	attended	a	
Chinese	Opera	performance	in	celebration	of	the	
New	Year.	This	extremely	rare	occasion	was	
broadcast	nationally	and	internationally	(Xinhua	
Net,	2017).	
	
There	are	two	'firsts'	in	the	above	events:	this	was	
the	first	time	since	Mao	Zedong’s	1942	Yan’an	
‘Talks	on	Literature	and	Art’	that	any	leading	CCP	
chairman	had	delivered	a	speech	on	the	role	of	
arts	and	artists	(using	the	same	title).	Secondly,	
this	is	the	first	time	since	Mao’s	era	that	CCP	
leading	members	have	collectively	attended	a	
Chinese	opera	performance,	and	which	has	been	
repeated	annually	to	this	day.	This	paper	explores	
the	significance	of	Chinese	opera	in	relation	to	the	
CCP	ideological	evolution,	contextualised	in	the	
broader	and	significant	cultural	industries	reform.	
	
China	market	reform	was	launched	in	1978	in	
selected	rural	areas	under	the	theme	of	the	
“responsibility	system”.	Once	it	proved	successful,	
in	the	mid	1980s,	it	was	expanded	to	urban	cities,	
across	material	and	art	sectors.	Under	this	
scheme,	art	institutions	take	responsibility	for	
their	own	economic	survival,	and	individual	artists	
are	encouraged	to	create	and	make	profit	outside	
the	institutions.	Market	reform	may	have	
accelerated	since	1992	(following	the	Tiananmen	
Square	event)	but	for	the	art	institutions,	it	was	
not	until	the	early	2000s	that	art	market	reform	
was	intensified	with	a	newly	emerging	discourse	
of	Cultural	and	Creative	Industries.	In	2004,	the	
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phrase	‘Cultural	and	Creative	Industries’	first	
arrived	in	Shanghai	when	the	Shanghai	Creative	
Industries	Development	Forum	2004,	the	first	of	
its	kind	in	China,	was	held	in	Shanghai	(Li	2011:	
13).	The	discourse	follows	closely	the	1998	UK	
policy	of	reviving	the	post-industrial	society	
through	culture	and	creativity	(DCMS,	1998).	It	
was	not	until	2009,	however,	that	Chinese	
national	policy	adopted	the	term	and	formed	a	
visible	policy	discourse.	Between	the	policy	
synonyms	of	cultural	industries,	cultural	economy,	
creative	industries	and	creative	economy,	China	
preferred	"Cultural	and	Creative	Industries"	–	
hereafter,	CCI	(White	and	Xu,	2012).	Since	2010,	
we	have	seen	intensified	nationwide	art	market	
restructuring	under	the	new	name	of	CCI	reform.	
China’s	new	political	and	economic	ambition	is	set	
to	make	the	CCI	its	pillar	economy	by	2020	(Zhang,	
2017,	Ma,	2015,	White	and	Xu,	2012,	Su,	2011,	
Zheng,	2010,	Hartley	and	Montgomery,	2009,	
O’Connor,	2009,	Chang	2009,	Kong,	2005,	Keane,	
2004).		
	
In	the	monograph,	Urban	Politics	and	Cultural	
Capital,	the	case	of	Chinese	opera	(Ma,	2015),	the	
author	defines	the	interrelation	between	the	
struggle	of	Chinese	art	market	reform/CCI	reform	
in	the	new	millennium	and	the	CCPs’	struggle	in	
retaining	political	(representative)	legitimacy.	This	
is,	as	the	author	argues,	because	Chinese	opera	
has	been,	and	remains,	the	popular	art	form	
amongst	peasants	and	workers.	Under	Mao,	
Chinese	opera	was	institutionalised	and	Chinese	
artists	were	provided	unprecedented	political	
capital,	and	were	made	the	new	elite	class.	This	
act	ensured	that	the	historically	repressed	social	
class,	and	their	associated	art	forms,	gained	
distinction,	which	in	turn	provided	the	CCP	with	
identified	representation	and	legitimacy.	In	the	
post-Mao	era,	opera	institutions	are	placed	under	
dual	pressures	of	gaining	economic	success	whilst	
supporting	CCP	ideological	legitimacy.	Chinese	
opera	companies	are	forced	to	abandon	the	
traditional	Chinese	opera	audience	of	the	
peasants	and	workers,	who	cannot	provide	the	
required	economic	success	and	legitimacy,	whilst	
struggling	to	reach	the	new	middle-class	audience	
and	nurture	their	new	taste	towards	traditional	
opera.	In	this	process,	Chinese	opera	struggles	to	
articulate	its	value	and	representation;	such	
struggle	mirrors	directly	the	CCP	ideological	
evolution	in	articulating	its	own	representation	
and	legitimacy	(Ma,	2015:	2-10).		
	
This	article	expands	the	above	argument	in	
relation	to	China’s	art	market	reforms	within	the	
latest	discourse	of	cultural	and	creative	industries.	
Contextualized	in	the	case	study	of	Xi’an	Qinqiang	
(Qin	opera)	institution	reform	in	the	early	21st	
century,	this	paper	argues	that	Xi	Jinping’s	
inaugurated	speech	on	Literature	and	Art,	
together	with	the	CCP’s	leading	members	
collective	opera	viewing,	highlight	the	urgency	of	
the	CCP’s	re-articulation	of	its	representation	and	
legitimacy.	This	paper	suggests	that	despite	
fundamental	alterations	in	CCP	ideological	
representation,	the	reason	for	the	CCP	retaining	
legitimacy	lies	in	the	unique	regional-central	
government	structure	and	the	social	mediator	role	
of	the	artists.	The	continued	negotiation	between	
central	(ideology),	regional	(urbanization)	and	
social	community	(artists)	levels,	supporting	each	
other	for	their	own	survival	and	legitimacy,	forms	
the	structure	of	China’s	latest	art	market	reform,	
in	the	name	of	"cultural	and	creative	industries".		
	
This	paper	consists	of	two	parts.	Part	one	conveys	
three	key	concepts	of	cultural	and	creative	
industries:	cultural	policy,	urban	development	and	
artists	–	contextualized	in	terms	of	China's	
political,	economic	and	social	conditions.	Part	two	
exemplifies	the	uniqueness	of	Chinese	cultural	
industries	through	a	case	study	of	Xi’an	Qinqiang	
company	reform,	which	took	place	in	the	late	
2000s	and	early	2010s.	For	the	completion	of	this	
paper,	a	one	month	period	of	field	research	took	
place	in	Xi’an,	with	the	assistance	of	the	Xi’an	Arts	
Research	Institution.	Around	twenty	interviews	
were	conducted,	including	scholars,	performers,	
directors,	senior	administrators	and	audience	
members.	The	field	research	data	forms	the	
empirical	basis	of	the	argumentation.		
Part	1:	Discourse	of	Chinese	Cultural	and	
Creative	Industries	
CCP	Ideology	vs.	Cultural	Policy	
It	has	been	suggested	that	China	does	not	have	a	
national	culture	policy.	Instead,	the	CCP	has	
provided	systematic	direction	for	political,	
economic	and	cultural	policy	making	(Wang,	2017;	
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Su,	2015;	Ma,	2015;	Zhang,	2010).	In	this	section,	
we	will	focus	on	the	evolution	of	CCP	ideology	and	
how	it	influences	Chinese	art	market	
development.		
	
Fei	Xiaotong,	the	founding	figure	of	Chinese	
sociology,	states	in	his	book	From	the	Soil	
(1947/1992)	that	the	foundation	of	Chinese	
society	emerges	from	the	rural.	In	the	creation	of	
Modern	China	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	
whilst	the	Nationalist	Party	relied	on	economically	
powerful	middle-class	entrepreneurs	to	gain	
legitimacy,	the	Communist	Party	turned	to	the	
rural	peasants	and	working	class	for	support,	(and	
which	made	up	over	90	percent	of	the	total	
population).	In	1942,	Mao	Zedong	delivered	his	
famous	‘Talks	on	Literature	and	Art’	from	the	then	
CCP’s	headquarters	in	Yan’an.	In	this	talk,	Mao	
articulated	that	"our	literature	and	art	are	for	the	
workers,	the	class	that	leads	the	revolution;	and	
peasants,	the	most	numerous	and	most	steadfast	
of	our	allies	in	the	revolution"	(1972:	29).	The	CCP	
gained	a	founding	legitimacy	and	then	ruling	
power	through	the	support	of	the	peasants	and	
workers	–	with	the	promise	of	representing	the	
historically	repressed	underclass	and	turning	them	
into	the	new	masters	of	the	new	regime,	namely	
the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(Su,	2015;	Chang,	
2009).		
	
The	CCP	founding	ideology	and	modes	of	political	
representation	began	to	evolve	in	the	post-Mao	
era.	If	Deng	Xiaoping’s	call	in	1979	to	allow	"a	
small	number	of	people	to	become	rich	first"	was	
accepted	by	the	mass	people	as	the	short-term	
solution	to	economic	development,	Jiang	Zemin’s	
2002	statement	of	"The	Three	Represents",	
welcomed	capitalists	into	CCP	membership,	cast	
doubt	on	CCP	representation	and	legitimacy	(Jiang	
2002:	177).	This	ideological	evolution	continued,	
and	in	2004,	only	a	year	after	Hu	Jintao’s	
succession	(2003	to	2012),	the	President	stressed	
his	famous	concept	of	a	"unified	harmonious	
society",	expressing	the	need	for	continuous	
economic	growth	in	the	name	of	"generating	
welfare	for	all"	(Zheng,	2010:	66,	emphasis	mine).	
Then	in	March	2007,	Prime	Minister	Wen	Jiabao	
made	even	more	explicit	references	regarding	
"the	party-state	representation	of	all	different	
viewpoints	and	sharing	the	world	in	common"	
(Zheng	2010:	266,	emphasis	mine).	Such	blurred	
ideological	representation	placed	CCP	legitimacy	
under	increasing	scrutiny	(Lu,	2015;	Lu,	Yang	and	
Li,	2008;	Sato	and	Shi,	2006;	Chen,	2001).		
	
The	CCP	struggle	of	articulation	in	the	practice	of	
political	representation	is	reflected	directly	in	the	
struggle	of	Chinese	opera	reform.	In	the	post-Mao	
era,	Chinese	opera	institutions,	which	were	
established	in	the	1950s,	began	to	see	the	
withdrawal	of	state	funding,	and	were	forced	to	
justify	their	legitimacy	through	the	dual	demands	
of	economic	profit-making	and	a	continued	role	in	
CCP	legitimacy-maintenance	(Ma,	2015).	The	
challenge,	however,	was	that	the	base	of	the	
opera	audience	remains	the	rural	population	and	
urban	working	class.	In	the	last	decade,	the	world	
has	seen	China’s	fast	economic	rise,	but	also	
witnessed	a	gulf	of	class	division	between	a	small	
number	of	elite	and	the	mass	underclass,	made	up	
predominantly	of	peasants	and	workers	(Xu,	2014;	
Keith	and	Lash,	2013;	Wang,	2006;	Yao,	2004).	In	
the	post-Mao	era,	these	people	constituted	the	
lowest	economic,	social	and	educational	group	
and	are	still	often	referred	to	as	"the	
disadvantaged	group"	(Goodman,	2014;	Chen	and	
Hamori,	2014;	Chung,	2013).	They	cannot	provide	
opera	houses	with	required	financial	returns,	
hence	contribute	to	the	opera	company's	own	
legitimacy-building,	nor	does	the	opulent	opera	
represent	the	value	and	identity	of	the	peasants	
and	workers.	Increasingly,	the	opera	houses	
abandoned	their	traditional	audience	
constituency,	nurturing	instead	young	
professionals	and	the	new	middle	class	who	
possessed	financial	capital.	However,	these	new	
audience	groups	possessed	the	least	"habitus"	(in	
Bourdieu's	sense)	for	the	appreciation	of	local	
opera,	and	also	possessed	the	least	desire	to	
"consume"	cultural	products	that	are	embedded	
with	CCP	ideological	values.	Chinese	opera’s	
alienation	from	both	categories	of	audience	–	the	
peasants	and	workers	and	the	new	middle	class	–	
articulates	the	CCP's	own	struggle	to	speak	its	
own	legitimacy	to	society's	new	constituencies,	
while	continuing	to	represent	“all”.		
	
The	significance	of	Xi	Jinping’s	2014	Beijing	Talk,	
addressing	traditional	art	forms	as	the	anchor	of	
Chinese	future	and	its	cultural	industries,	and	the	
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following	event	where	all	the	members	of	the	
China	Central	Standing	Committee	joined	an	
opera	audience,	was	not	merely	cultural	or	
aesthetic.	It	was	a	politically	symbolic	act.	It	was	a	
re-articulation	of	the	CCP's	founding	ideology	
(from	Mao’s	era)	involving	an	unmistakable	
representation	of	the	CCP’s	founding	
constituencies	–	peasants	and	workers.	Moreover,	
we	can	identify	the	ideological	struggle	of	the	CCP	
and	its	modes	of	representation	at	a	regional	
level,	in	the	growing	phenomenon	of	urban	
development.		
	
Urban	Development		
When	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	was	
established	in	1949,	the	Chinese	urban	rate	of	
growth	was	from	a	baseline	of	10.6%	of	the	total	
population;	by	2011,	the	urban	population	is	
51.3%.	For	the	first	time	in	Chinese	history,	the	
majority	of	the	population	live	in	urban	cities	
(National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	2007,	2011);	and	in	
the	past	three	decades,	China’s	urbanization	has	
been	focused	on	creating	city	distinction	and	
attractions	for	both	tourists	and	investors	(Fung	
and	Erni,	2013;	Chen,	2009).	The	creation	of	
successful	cities	is	a	major	national	policy	
objective.	The	dual	pressure	shouldered	by	the	
CCP	–	ideological	and	economic	–	is	therefore	
further	refracted	at	regional	and	municipal	levels.	
There	are	two	dimensions	of	governance,	
representation	and	legitimacy-building	for	
regional	and	municipal	government	–	two	
distinctive	areas	of	ideological	and	economic	
pressure	–	central-regional	management,	and	
local	property	developers	(acting	as	project	
executioners).	We	will	consider	these	both.	
	
Central-regional	management	structure	
In	the	recent	rapid	and	politically-engineered	
process	of	mass	urbanisation	in	China,	the	country	
has	been	following	a	unique	central-regional	
decentralization	management	structure.	Instead	
of	having	regional	resources	decentralized	into	
the	hands	of	individual	entrepreneurs,	they	are	all	
placed	under	the	management	of	the	municipal	
government,	with	certain	independent	policy-
making	responsibilities	and	high-profit	attainment	
as	an	incentive.	If	the	‘managers’	become	overly	
unruly,	for	political	and/or	economic	reasons,	they	
could	be	dismissed	and	replaced	by	members	of	
the	central	party-state	management.	This	is	what	
is	often	referred	to	in	the	context	of	the	politically	
directed,	market-oriented	strategic	framework	of	
China's	economic	reform	(Shirk,	2011;	Naughton,	
1996).		
	
In	Practical	Reason:	On	the	theory	of	action	
(1998),	Bourdieu	reminds	us	that	in	a	socialist	
regime,	the	government	monopolizes	the	market	
and	effectively	functions	as	a	"central	bank",	
where	the	party-state	has	the	power	to	
redistribute	resources	and	capitals	to	make	new	
elites	as	appropriate.	In	China,	the	central	
government	not	only	acts	as	a	central	bank	but	
also	holds	direct	managerial	power	over	regional	
government.	Even	if	this	seeming	line-
management	is	complex,	it	makes	central	
government	the	fulcrum	and	most	powerful	
player	in	the	game	of	market	development,	and	
ensures	that	regional	(and	municipal)	government	
is	obligated	to	support	CCP	ideological	
development,	for	maximized	resource	allocation,	
policy	development,	and	therefore	the	successful	
growth	of	its	major	cities	and	thus	economy	as	a	
whole.	
	
Property	developers	as	project	executioners	
Once	in	line	with	the	CCP	ideological	
development,	the	regional	government	needs	to	
further	demonstrate	its	legitimacy	through	market	
economic	success.	As	China’s	urban	development	
consumes	over	50	per	cent	of	its	natural	resource	
production	(iron	ore,	steel	and	coal	and	so	on),	
the	construction	industry	has	become	a	major	
driver	of	economic	development	and	guaranteed	
economic	returns	for	any	municipality	(Anderlini,	
2011).	To	ensure	a	quick	profit	return	(and	
registered	economic	development	indications)	a	
regional	government	assigns	major	public	works	
projects	to	property	developers.	
	
In	the	process	of	such	profit-led	economic	reform,	
the	primary	groups	for	which	change	is	registered	
is	the	rural	peasants	and	urban	workers.	Between	
1987	and	2001,	over	60	million	rural	residents	lost	
claims	to	the	land	on	which	they	had	previously	
worked,	generating	an	unprecedented	wave	of	
rural-to-urban	migration.	Due	to	a	unique	two-
class	hukou	system	–	which	was	introduced	in	
1958	to	manage	population	distribution	–	rural	
hukou	holders	in	urban	cities	have	no	claim	to	
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welfare	systems	such	as	housing,	schooling	or	
hospitals	and	are	also	awarded	limited	legal	
protection.	And	from	the	mid	1990s,	urban	
workers	have	experienced	large	scale	redundancy,	
with	women	and	the	middle	aged	suffering	the	
worst.	Meanwhile,	the	government	property	
boom	and	infrastructural	development	had	been	
focusing	on	"gated	valleys"	(security-zoned	
residential	luxury	housing),	internationally	
franchised	shopping	malls,	and	grand	theatres,	
facilitated	by	urban	planning	methods	that	have	
effectively	dismembered	social	communities	
without	allowing	for	the	development	of	new	
ones	(Harvey,	2009;	Cai,	2000).	Even	though	
regional	governments	may	thus	have	fulfilled,	in	
the	short	term,	their	dual	requirements	in	
supporting	CCP	ideological	direction	as	well	as	
economic	development,	a	by-product	is	the	loss	of	
trust	and	political	clarity	in	the	function	of	
government.	This	extends	to	a	loss	of	morality	and	
fundamental	political	belief	in	the	principles	of	the	
State.	The	national	scandal	of	baby	milk	
contamination	after	July	2008	–	with	an	estimated	
300,000	victims	and	an	international	scandal	after	
attracting	the	World	Health	Organisation	–	was	
symptomatic	of	a	lack	of	political	focus	on	the	
non-economic	non-governmental	aspects	of	social	
life.	Fundamental	questions	of	value,	belief,	
ideological	representation	and	legitimacy	are	now	
routinely	directed	not	only	at	the	regional	
governments	but	the	CCP	(Lu,	2015;	Shi,	2015;	
Goodman,	2014:	44;	Shen,	2008).		
	
Xi’s	Beijing	Speech,	asserting	that	"arts	and	artists	
must	not	lose	direction	in	the	wave	of	market	
economy,	must	not	be	the	slave	of	capital",	and	
the	CCP	leading	officials	viewing	of	Chinese	opera,	
can	be	situated	within	a	reargued	attempt	to	
readdress	the	ideological	impact	of	a	hugely	
imbalanced	social	development	through	rapid	
urbanisation.	Moreover,	the	significant	issue	
remains	in	the	form	of	the	consequent	
exacerbation	of	class	divisions,	and	how	the	CCP	
are	managing	and	articulating	their	own	
legitimacy.	This	issue	pertains	at	community	level.	
	
Chinese	Opera	Artists	and	the	Political	Capital	
Following	Florida’s	The	Rise	of	the	Creative	Class	
(2002),	there	has	been	increasing	research	on	
Chinese	artists,	community	building	and	civil	
society	development	(Kong,	2014;	Fung	and	Erni,	
2013;	Lisitzin	and	Stovel,	2002).	Artists	as	a	
professional	category	can	be	sub-divided	into	two	
basic	groups:	the	traditional	"scholar	artists",	and	
"opera	artists"	or	performers	who	obtained	
political	distinction	under	Mao’s	regime.	Both	
artists’	groups	act	as	mediators	of	central-regional	
government	policy,	actively	reviving	regional	art	
markets	and	local	communities.	However,	
pressure	to	preserve	their	own	professional	
identity	and	distinction	means	that	their	role	as	
mediators	is	collaborative	in	nature;	they	do	not	
function	independently,	and	not	in	a	way	in	which	
they	could	challenge	the	ideological	development	
of	regional	government	market-orientation.	Their	
support	of	opera	art	forms	and	associated	local	
communities	may	be	valuable,	but	is	limited.		
	
1)	Historical	Elite	Scholar	Artists	
Fei	Xiaotong	in	China's	gentry:	essays	on	rural-
urban	relations	(1980)	asserted	that	in	a	
traditional	agrarian	society	(such	as	China),	
although	government	rule	may	be	dictatorial,	the	
force	of	that	form	of	power	does	not	penetrate	to	
community	level	to	any	great	extent.	Instead,	the	
basic	unit	of	society	is	family,	and	a	truly	pervasive	
power	is	generated	through	patriarchal	privilege,	
or	what	is	traditionally	called	paternalism	–	the	
notional	rule	by	elders.	In	particular,	and	
historically	in	China,	these	male	elders	or	rulers	
were	predominantly	learned	Confucius	scholars	
(shidaifu).	They	maintained	a	position	of	respect	
at	the	pinnacle	of	Chinese	society,	second	only	to	
members	of	the	Imperial	family.	They	were	the	
leading	figures	of	the	community	and	took	on	key	
roles,	such	as	in	negotiating	between	the	imperial	
rule,	local	economy	management	and	community	
building	(Yao,	2000,	Murck,	1980:	1).		
	
2)	New	Elite	Opera	Artists	
At	the	opposite	end	of	the	social	stratum	were	the	
Chinese	opera	performers.	In	traditional	Chinese	
society,	scholars	were	certainly	at	the	top	of	social	
career	scales,	whilst	opera	singers,	together	with	
prostitutes	and	beggars	formed	the	lowest	
category	(Goldman	and	Leo,	2002;	Schwartz,	
1996:	38).	Kraus	in	The	Party	and	the	Arty	in	China	
(2004)	pointed	out	that	under	the	People’s	
Republic	of	China,	performers	gained	a	significant	
professional	artistic	status.	While	this	is	true,	but	
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with	the	State	distribution	of	political	capital	and	
recognition,	principally	through	institutions	and	
titles,	the	fundamental	change	is	artists	were	co-
opted	into	the	State.	Though	state	patronage,	
opera	singers	became	part	of	an	elite	social	class.	
This	change	was	unprecedented	and	altered	the	
artists’	historical	relationship	with	the	State	(Ma,	
2015:	43).		
	
Evasdottir	in	Obedient	Autonomy	(2004),	argues	
that	the	Chinese	scholar	exists	within	a	constant	
dilemma,	and	so	struggling	to	retain	a	sense	of	
intellectual	integrity	–	between	simultaneously	
fulfilling	their	obligations	to	government	and	to	
the	mass	population.	Even	though	scholars	are	the	
leading	historical	figures	in	any	local	community,	
their	sense	of	self-preservation	made	them	
reluctant	to	challenge	the	limits	on	their	political	
influence.	Before	becoming	the	elite	class	
themselves,	opera	performers	acted	for	the	
audiences	of	their	own	class,	often	mocked	the	
State,	challenged	and	questioned	injustice	on	
behalf	of	their	audience,	which	were,	of	course,	
the	lower	classes	(Wu,	2006).	Upon	receiving	
noble	status,	opera	performers	were	conscious	of	
that	their	new	found	distinction	and	professional	
legitimacy	was	only	obtained	through	a	unique	
historical	opportunity.	And	as	with	the	scholars,	
opera	performers	faced	the	same	dilemma	of	
integrity:	their	obligation	to	the	masses	and	to	
serving	the	state	on	whose	patronage	they	had	
received.	Their	historically	liberal	spirit,	seizing	the	
freedom	to	challenge	and	mock	authority,	with	
increasingly	imposed	State	censorship,	was	lost.	
	
In	the	21st	Century,	both	scholar	artists	and	opera	
artists,	remain	active	mediators	between	
community,	regional	and	central	governments.	
They	lobby	on	behalf	of	the	community	for	
resources,	and	they	routinely	report	on	dilemmas	
emerging	in	cultural	and	art	market	reforms.	
However,	as	elite	and	recognised	servants	of	the	
State,	the	political	complexion	of	their	lobbying	is	
such	that	it	is	entirely	compatible	with	the	
political	protocols	of	party	and	State,	and	no	
threat	to	the	State's	legitimacy.	And	given	how	
little	the	community	structure	(and	position	of	
scholars)	and	social	class-basis	of	opera	audiences	
have	changed,	the	artists'	role	in	mediating	
between	the	State	and	the	people	remains	a	
significant	one,	if	currently	noncontentious.	Given	
the	fundamental	ideological	shifts	and	changes	in	
governance	I	outlined	above,	and	the	continued	
need	for	the	CCP	to	maintain	a	role	as	
uncontested	socio-political	authority,	the	critical	
juncture	of	strength	that	allows	this	apparent	
contradiction	to	be	maintained	is	the	juncture	
between	China’s	unique	regional-central	
government	structure	and	the	social	mediation	
roles	of	the	artists.	This	juncture	is	a	‘trialectical’	
and	dynamic	cooperation	–	between	central	
government	(the	source	of	national	ideology),	
regional	government	(managing	urbanisation	and	
economic	growth)	and	local	community	(where	
the	artists	media	with	the	masses	through	times	
of	profound	change).	Each	of	these	political	
spheres	co-operate	and	support	each	other	for	
their	own	survival	and	legitimacy.	To	understand	
in	more	detail	how	this	works,	we	need	to	
consider	the	structure	of	China’s	latest	discourse	
of	art	and	market	reforms	–	the	Xi’an	Qinqiang	
(Qin	opera)	cultural	industries	reform.	
Part	2:	Case	Study	Qinqiang	Cultural	
Industries	Reform	
Few	non-Chinese	readers	will	be	familiar	with	
Qinqiang	or	Qin	opera,	but	will	no	doubt	have	
heard	of	the	Terracotta	Army	and	the	Great	Wall	
of	China.	Qin	is	the	name	for	the	region	in	today’s	
Shan’xi	province;	Qiang	means	musical	sound.	
Qinqiang	is	transliterated	as	the	musical	sound	of	
Qin.	Qinqiang	first	emerged	around	mid-Qin	State	
(770BC	–	221	BC)	and	was	evolved	into	a	popular	
regional	song	across	central	China,	including	
Shan’xi,	Shanxi	and	Gansu	(Ruan,	2006).	In	221BC,	
Yinzheng,	the	ruler	of	the	Qin	region	unified	China	
and	crowned	himself	as	the	first	Emperor	of	
China,	with	its	capital	set	up	at	today’s	Xi’an.	This	
very	word	Qinqiang	is	associated	with	the	
historical	Chinese	empire	(Zhao	and	Lan,	2014:	
11).	Developed	in	the	central	agricultural	
landscape	of	the	Yellow	Earth,	Qinqiang	is	
associated	with	the	sound	of	rural	peasants	and	
their	way	of	life.	Qi	Rushan,	Chinese	modern	
cultural	critic,	claims	that:	‘in	order	to	understand	
China,	one	must	know	Qinqiang’	(quoted	in	Zhen,	
2013).		
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In	1912,	amidst	China’s	modernization,	a	Shan’xi	
scholar	named	Li	Tongxuan	established	the	first	
modern	Qinqiang	company	in	Xi’an,	naming	it	Yi	
Su	Society.	The	very	name	symbolized	Chinese	
scholars’	ambitions	in	developing	a	modern	China:	
to	evolve	(Yi)	(peasant	audience)	traditional	way	
of	thinking	(Su)	through	revolutionising	opera	
(production	and	artists).	In	1951,	two	years	after	
the	establishment	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	
China,	Xi’an	municipal	government	re-established	
the	Yi	Su	Society	as	the	first	State	Qinqiang	House	
(Zhen,	2013,	Wang,	2011:	33).	Yi	Su	Society	rural	
performers	obtained	urban	status	and	
unprecedented	political	recognition	and	
benefitted	from	State	patronage.	In	the	post-Mao	
market	era,	opera	institutions	across	China	
experienced	market	reforms,	where,	earning	their	
own	revenues,	their	visible	economic	gain	became	
a	political	indicator	of	their	artistic	legitimacy	
(through	popularity	with	the	masses),	on	
condition	they	also	served	to	promote	CCP	
legitimacy.	The	CCP’s	very	latest	reforms	have	
changed	the	fate	of	Qinqiang	irreversibly.				
	
From	the	early	2000s,	the	CCP	had	been	engaged	
in	extensive	strategic	economic	development,	the	
great	New	Silk	Road	project.	When	US	Secretary	
of	State	Hillary	Clinton	proposed	a	‘New	Silk	Road’	
to	describe	a	U.S.	Policy	in	2011	–	an	imagined	
north-south	axis	designed	to	make	war-torn	
Afghanistan	a	regional	hub	–	the	CCP	reportedly	
had	"sleepless	nights"	(Fallon,	2015:	141).	In	2013,	
Xi	Jinping	first	announced	an	east-northwest	axis	
for	China	–	a	‘One	Road	and	One	Belt’	plan,	
emphasizing	both	land	and	maritime	Silk	roads,	
with	their	starting	points	in	China.	In	this	new	
revision	of	the	concept,	Xi’an	appeared	on	the	
latest	geographical	mapping	as	the	beginning	of	
the	land	Silk	route.	Consequently,	on	the	27th	May	
2015,	the	first	One	Belt	One	Road	China	National	
Forum	was	held	in	Xi’an.	In	this	forum,	State	
strategic	infrastructure	plans	and	investment	
details	were	announced,	with	Xi’an	being	the	
centre	of	this	new	distinction	(Xinhua	Net,	2016).	
	
Xi’an	is	a	city	with	layers	of	symbolic	meaning	and	
historical	distinction.	Since	the	archaeological	
discovery	of	the	Terracotta	Army	in	the	1970s,	
Xi’an	city’s	distinction	has	been	focused	on	the	
Qin	dynasty	(221BC-220AD)	and	Qinqiang	as	both	
the	preferred	community	entertainment	and	
distinctive	regional	cultural	capital.	However,	to	
support	the	CCP’s	new	ideological	orientation,	and	
to	secure	maximum	central	economic	investment,	
Xi’an	city	shifted	its	long-established	Qin	
association	to	the	Tang	dynasty	(644AD-988AD).	It	
was	during	the	Tang	period	that	Monk	Xuanzong	
brought	back	the	Sanskrit	from	India	through	the	
Silk	route	under	the	royal	Tang	mission.	This	part	
of	history	is	well	documented,	and	provided	Xi’an	
and	China	nationally	the	legitimate	claim	to	
establish	the	starting	point	of	any	new	land-based	
Silk	route	(Zhao	and	Lan,	2014;	Zhen,	2013;	Chen,	
2011;	He,	2010).		
	
From	the	early	2000s,	the	Xi’an	municipal	
government	had	begun	contracting	the	Qu	Jiang	
New	District	Property	Developer	(QJ	hereafter)	for	
strategic	city	regeneration.	One	of	the	main	QJ	
developments	has	been	the	building	of	the	Grand	
Tang	Theme	Park,	and	since	2013,	in	line	with	Xi	
Jinping’s	‘One	Road	and	One	Belt’	plan,	further	
investment	has	been	put	into	the	Grand	Tang	
Theme	Park,	with	marketing	material	focused	on	
the	Grand	Goose	Pagoda	–	where	it	is	claimed	the	
Sanskrit	brought	back	from	India	was	stored,	
highlighting	Monk	Xuanzong’s	successful	
completion	of	the	Silk	route	mission.	In	the	
rebranding	of	Xi’an	culture	from	the	Qin	Dynasty	
to	the	Tang	Dynasty,	it	is	to	be	noted	that	as	there	
is	no	specific	opera	associated	with	Tang,	but	now	
a	new	cultural	industry	around	Tang	dance,	
manifest	in	a	show	produced	specifically	for	
visitors.	From	the	early	2010s,	in	collaboration	
with	Xi’an	Dance	Company,	Xi’an	municipal	
government	and	QJ	co-produced	the	Grand	Tang	
Performance,	and	nearly	every	visitor	to	Xi’an	will	
be	advised	at	tourist	information	desks	and	all	
hotels	to	take	the	Dumpling	Banquet	with	the	
Grand	Tang	Performance.	Tang	culture	swiftly	
developed	into	a	new	chain	of	cultural	industry	
ventures,	ranging	from	theme	parks,	grand	
performances	and	banquets.	Tang	culture	became	
the	latest	"invented"	Xi’an	cultural	identity	and	
distinction,	supporting	the	CCP’s	strategic	plan	of	
‘One	Road	and	One	Belt’,	and	securing	central	
investment	for	sketching	such	a	grand	blueprint.	
	
In	the	process	of	city	rebranding,	funding	
originally	allocated	to	Qinqiang	was	reduced	
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substantially.	From	the	mid	2000s,	within	a	policy	
announced	as	the	"cultural	industries	reform",	
Xi’an	municipal	government	transferred	
management	power	of	all	Qinqiang	companies	
from	the	municipal	cultural	department	to	QJ.	The	
most	controversial	move	came	on	the	10th	June	
2009,	when	QJ	ordered	all	Qinqiang	Houses	in	
Xi’an	to	change	from	non-profit	to	profit-making	
organizations.	Three	largest	Qinqiang	Companies	
were	requested	to	merge	into	the	Yi	Su	Society,	
with	all	performers	aged	45	and	above	being	
made	redundant.	All	these	changes	were	
completed	within	90	days.	This	process	was	
proudly	referenced	by	QJ	as	to	have	resolved	
issues	with	"one	single	swing	of	a	machete"	
(yidaoqie)	(private	communication,	29th	January	
2015).	The	rapid	dictate	was	further	praised	by	
Xi’an	government	as	"the	model	example	of	Xi’an	
cultural	industries	reform	success"	(He	2010:	259-
263).		
	
In	response	to	the	cultural	industries	reform,	
some	artists	took	actions	to	lobby	against	the	
destruction	of	community,	trying	to	preserve	
Qinqiang.	The	examples	given	in	this	paper	are	
scholar	artist	Zhong	Mingshan	and	opera	artist	
Dir.	Liu.		
	
1.	Scholar	Artist	and	the	Qinqiang	Museum	
Zhong	Mingshan	describes	himself	as	an	
archaeologist,	historian	and	devoted	Qinqiang	
lover.	To	others,	Zhong	is	a	nationally	renowned	
scholar-artist,	famous	for	his	calligraphy	and	
painting.	His	work	has	been	admired	by	many	
state	leaders,	with	patrons	including	former	
president	Jiang	Zemin.	Such	connections	provide	
Zhong	the	best	opportunities	for	lobbying	for	
Qinqiang.	Since	Qinqiang	cultural	industries	
reform,	Zhong	has	been	petitioning	directly	to	his	
patron	Jiang	Zemin	for	"the	criminal	act"	that	QJ	
have	caused	to	the	indigenous	culture	and	
community	life	of	the	locale	(private	
communication,	20th	January	2015).	Zhong’s	
complaining	did	not	stop	the	CCP	orchestrated	
Xi’an	city	rebranding,	nor	the	municipal	
government	contracted	property	developers	fast	
profit	return.	What	Zhong	did	obtain	from	the	
central	government	is	a	Qinqiang	museum	space.	
In	2013,	the	first	Qinqiang	museum	opened	in	
Xi’an	Jiaotong	University,	located	in	the	suburbs	of	
Xi’an.	It	is	a	grand	and	spacious	three-floor	
building	with	the	basement	level	contains	the	
performing	space	of	a	traditional	theatre	with	
around	fifty	seats.	The	ground	floor	displays	a	
variety	of	cultural	items	ranging	from	the	first	
original	handwritten	Qinqiang	scripts	to	ancient	
musical	instruments,	costumes	and	other	related	
pieces.	The	spiral	stairs	in	the	middle	of	the	
exhibition	room	leads	to	the	second	floor,	which	
has	further	collections	from	the	oldest	Qinqiang	
scripts	to	a	set	of	Qinqiang	leather	puppets	used	
in	Zhang	Yimou’s	internationally	popular	film	To	
Live	(1994).	The	space	is	used	for	University	
Students	Quality	Training	Base	(suzhi	jiaoyu	jidi)	–	
a	compulsory	training	programme	involving	
traditional	art	forms,	imposed	on	all	Chinese	
university	students	since	the	1989	Tiananmen	
event.	However,	during	the	entire	month	of	my	
research,	the	grand	space	was	permanently	
empty.	When	I	asked	Zhong	if	a	city	centre	space	
had	been	explored	to	attract	more	visitors,	Zhang	
displayed	some	agitation:	
Don’t	ask	me	why	I	have	the	museum	
in	a	university	instead	of	the	city	centre.	Of	
course	I	know	this	place	is	too	tucked	away	
and	the	city	centre	was	the	first	location	I	
sought	after.	But	nowadays	in	China	
everything	has	been	passed	onto	the	
property	developer.	The	municipal	cultural	
bureau	does	not	even	have	a	say	in	cultural	
space	management.	This	space	is	the	result	
of	my	direct	contact	with	"high	up".	Our	
own	culture	is	destroyed	under	the	very	
name	of	cultural	industries	(wenhua	
chanye)!	I	will	continue	to	lobby	until	the	
wrong	is	put	right!’	(Private	communication,	
20th	January	2015)	
Until	this	day,	Zhong	articulates	the	need	for	
Qinqiang	performing	space	in	the	city	centre,	and	
the	importance	of	educating	the	younger	
generation	to	learn	about	Qinqiang.	Despite	the	
empty	museum,	Zhong	is	positive	that	the	current	
madness	of	"cultural	industries	reform"	is	
temporary	and	local	Qinqiang	as	the	community	
people’s	way	of	life	will	return	in	the	future.	Until	
that	day	arrives,	Zhong	will	continue	to	work	in	his	
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museum	space,	on	a	university	campus	that	is	
tucked	away	from	city	visitors	and	the	fast	
changing	urban	landscape.		
	
2.	Opera	Artist	and	Qinqiang	Troupe	
Director	Liu	became	a	member	of	the	Yi	Su	Society	
in	the	1950s.	He	was	trained	in	Qinqiang	
performance	and	later	specialised	in	script	writing.	
When	Liu	retired	in	the	early	2000s	he	witnessed	
the	process	of	cultural	industries	reform	with	the	
large	redundancy	of	middle	aged	actors	and	felt	a	
strong	sense	of	duty	to	bring	these	performers	
back	onto	the	stage:		
They	are	too	young	to	retire	from	the	
stage.	It	is	extremely	difficult	to	train	opera	
performers,	as	it	is	a	highly	synthetic	art	
form	consisting	of	dancing,	performing,	
singing	and	acting,	children	need	to	start	
their	training	from	4	or	5	years	of	age	in	
order	to	achieve	the	right	posture	and	
aesthetic	body	movements;	just	when	they	
are	able	to	perform,	they	are	made	
redundant!	They	have	been	well	trained	
and	they	can	offer	the	best	performance	to	
the	audience	(Private	communication,	29th	
January	2015).		
In	2007,	Liu	established	the	Xi’an	Qinqiang	
Association,	with	performers	consisting	entirely	of	
redundant	staff	from	all	Xi’an	Qinqiang	
companies.	No	one	takes	any	regular	wage,	
payment	is	only	allocated	through	performance.	
The	association	performs	both	traditional	and	new	
productions.	Liu	writes	scripts	and	co-directs	
performances	with	actors.	Because	of	this,	
everyone	now	addresses	him	with	the	respectful	
title	of	Dir.	Liu.		
	
The	main	challenge	that	Liu’s	opera	troupe	faces	is	
the	expensive	urban	theatre	rental	fee.	According	
to	Dir.	Liu,	under	QJ,	Xi’an	city’s	small	and	medium	
scaled	theatres	were	cleared	for	urban	
development.	To	ensure	the	troupe’s	survival,	Dir.	
Liu	takes	the	team	to	the	rural	countryside,	where	
they	still	perform	for	community	gatherings	and	
are	paid	collectively	by	village	organizations:	
Qinqiang	has	a	very	good	audience	
base	in	both	urban	cities	and	in	the	
countryside.	However,	it	is	increasingly	
difficult	to	obtain	affordable	space	to	
perform	in	urban	cities	and	the	box	office	
struggles	to	sell	individual	tickets.	These	are	
no	issues	in	the	countryside	as	the	
performance	is	paid	for	by	the	organization	
for	everyone	to	enjoy	in	a	public	space	–	
like	how	opera	has	been	staged	for	
thousands	of	years	in	China.	The	most	
profitable	and	popular	performance	source	
we	are	making	nowadays	is	indeed	through	
rural	tours	(Private	communication,	29th	
January	2015).		
However,	in	the	past	seven	years,	Dir.	Liu	has	
witnessed	entire	villages	disappear	within	a	
fortnight,	for	various	property	development	
projects.	This	means	the	disappearance	of	the	
rural	audience	along	with	performing	space.	Liu’s	
troupe	had	to	travel	further	away	to	seek	
audiences.	To	do	this,	Liu	required	a	Performing	
Vehicle	–	a	big	container	truck	which,	once	
stationed,	can	be	opened	and	used	as	a	stage.	It	is	
a	key	investment	for	a	private	performing	
company,	however,	Dir.	Liu’s	troupe	struggled	to	
purchase	one.	Liu	had	been	writing	regularly	to	
the	regional	government	applying	for	one	and	it	
was	not	until	the	early-2010s,	due	to	the	
increasing	reputation	of	Liu’s	Qinqiang	
Association,	that	the	company	was	eventually	
granted	one.	They	are	now	able	to	drive	further	
into	the	countryside	and	charge	around	
10,000RMB	per	performance,	which	lasts	
between	4	to	6	hours.	With	no	rental	fees	and	bills	
met	by	collective	villages	funds,	Liu’s	troupe	is	not	
only	covering	its	costs,	but	is	also	able	to	pay	the	
actors.	By	2015,	eight	years	after	its	initial	set	up,	
Liu’s	troupe	has	become	self-sustaining	and	
started	to	recruit	young	members	for	the	
development	of	the	Xi’an	Qinqiang	Association.		
	
Throughout	the	interviews,	neither	of	the	two	
artists	criticised	the	CCP	or	government	for	the	
impacts	of	its	ideological	orientation	on	opera	and	
its	audiences,	nor	on	regional	government	market	
management	style,	such	as	the	contracting	of	
property	developers	to	execute	cultural	projects.	
Instead,	the	criticism	is	focused	on	QJ	and	its	way	
of	managing	and	executing	art	companies	and	art	
markets.	Both	are	proud	of	their	individual	
achievements	in	securing	a	museum	space	and	
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performing	vehicle,	and	they	are	keen	to	continue	
collaborating	with	the	regional	government	and	
supporting	the	CCP.		
Conclusion	
Contextualized	in	the	case	study	of	Xi’an	Qinqiang	
cultural	industries	reform,	this	article	argued	that	
the	struggle	of	Chinese	opera	house	reform	in	the	
new	millennium	exemplifies	the	evolution	of	the	
CCP	in	gaining	legitimacy.	Xi’s	2014	Beijing	Speech	
and	the	viewing	of	Chinese	opera	by	all	seven	
members	of	the	China	Central	Standing	
Committee	should	not	be	viewed	as	simply	a	
cultural	choice	but	a	crucial	step	in	attempting	to	
re-address	CCP's	ideological	orientation.	Whilst	
obtaining	increased	economic	power,	the	CCP	also	
faces	the	challenge	of	a	widening	class	division,	
rural	and	urban	uneven	development,	all	of	which	
questions	the	CCP’s	founding	values,	political	
representation	and	thus	legitimacy.	Despite	
fundamental	ideological	developments,	the	CCP	
managed	to	maintain	legal	power	relies	on	China’s	
unique	regional-central	government	structure	and	
the	social	mediator	roles	occupied	by	the	artists.	
The	continued	negotiation	at	central,	regional	and	
community	levels,	supporting	each	other	for	their	
own	survival	and	legitimacy,	is	central	to	the	
consolidation	of	the	CCP	ruling	legitimacy.	
	
However,	this	article	also	points	out	that	without	
questioning	the	CCP	ideological	orientation,	the	
regional	government’s	dual	economic	and	
ideological	pressures	and	artist	‘obedient	
autonomy’,	the	provision	of	‘token	gestures’,	such	
as	a	museum	space	outside	the	city	centre	and	a	
travel	vehicle,	provide	little	improvement	to	the	
Chinese	opera	market	struggle	and	its	associated	
audiences’	political,	economic	and	social	
conditions.	Traditional	Chinese	opera,	together	
with	its	associated	audience	of	peasants	and	
workers	continue	to	struggle	for	the	right	to	
practice	their	historical	culture,	which	is	bound	up	
with	the	CCP’s	internal	struggle	for	re-gaining	its	
own	legitimacy.	Such	struggles	highlight	the	
intimate	relationship	between	Chinese	
Communist	Party	(CCP)	ideological	evolution,	
cultural	rights,	and	the	market	reforms	(in	the	
name	of	the	cultural	industries).	
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